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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida's new law,1  which F roscribes the administration of
medroxyprogesterone acetate ("MPA") to sexual battery offenders, became
effective in October of 1997. More than one hundred, out of one hundred
and twenty members of the House of Representatives, voted for the law, with
virtually no debate.3 The lawmakers' vote was bold because, although other
states have similar statutes,4 none have been challenged.5  Therefore, the
constitutionality of a law that mandates MPA treatment is still in question.
As with any new and untraditional method of crime prevention or
rehabilitation, 6 constitutional challenges are expected. The list of challengeswill probably include equal protection,7 cruel and unusual punishment,8
1. FLA. STAT. § 794.0235 (1997).
2. See discussion infra Part IV.
3. Jeremy Wallace, Chemical Castration Bill Passes in House, BRADENTON HERALD,
Apr. 25, 1997, at LI (stating that 108 of 120 House of Representatives members voted for the
MPA statute).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-44.2 (1982); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 538 (West 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-512 (1997).
5. Bryan Keene, Note, Chemical Castration: An Analysis of Florida's New
"Cutting-Edge" Policy Towards Sex Criminals, 49 FLA. L. REV. 803, 804 (1997) (discussing
MPA legislation).
6. See generally Kenneth B. Fromson, Note, Beyond an Eye for an Eye: Castration
as an Alternative Sentencing Measure, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 311, 313-17 (1994)
(discussing case and legislative history of castration in the United States).
7. Whether or not MPA statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause is an issue
because, although a statute may be gender neutral, the drug affects men and women
differently. Recent Legislation, Constitutional Law-Due Process and Equal Protection-
California Becomes First State to Require Chemical Castration of Certain Sex Offenders-
Act of Sept. 17, 1996, ch. 596, 1996, Cal. Stat. 92 (to be Codified at Cal. Penal Code § 645),
110 HARV. L. REV. 799, 801-04 (1997) (arguing that California's hormonal control statute
violates the Equal Protection Clause because MPA sterilizes women).
8. See Edward A. Fitzgerald, Chemical Castration: MPA Treatment of the Sexual
Offender, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 31 (1990) (explaining the history of the Eighth Amendment
and why MPA treatments are not cruel and unusual punishment); Larry Helm Spalding,
Florida's 1997 Chemical Castration Law: A Return to the Dark Ages, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
117, 130-31 (1998) (contending that hormonal control is cruel and unusual punishment); Jodi
Berlin, Note, Chemical Castration of Sex Offenders: "A Shot in the Arm" Towards
Rehabilitation, 19 WHrrrER L. REV. 169, 188-94, 212 (1997) (discussing the history and
legal tests for cruel and unusual punishment and explaining that MPA treatment is not cruel
and unusual punishment). MPA is not inherently cruel because the side effects are minimal
and reversible. Id. at 212. It "is proportional to the offense because it is" sentenced for the
same period of time as probation leaving "no arbitrary and excessive use" of MPA. Id. It is
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double jeopardy,9 due process, 0 First Amendment," and the right to
privacy. 2  Constitutional challenges were apparently anticipated, as
evidenced by the inclusion of a clause that protects the statute if part of it is
held invalid by providing that the parts that are not invalidated are still good
law.13
the least restrictive means of accomplishing "deterrence and rehabilitation" because physical
castration is more restrictive. Id.
9. Spalding, supra note 8, at 133-35 (arguing that the statute violates the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because a defendant's withdrawal from treatment
results in a violation of probation and a second-degree felony).
10. Due process requires that a condition of probation be reasonably related to the
crime that the defendant was convicted of, the prevention of future criminality, or public
safety. Id. at 131-32 (urging that MPA statute fails the reasonable relationship test required
of all probation conditions). "[W]ith regard to non-paraphiliacs and involuntarily-treated
paraphiliacs" MPA is not reasonably related to the goals of the statute because incarceration is
a "more narrowly tailored means" of accomplishing the state interest of protecting its citizens.
Id. at 132. The statute indiscriminately mandates MPA, and the statute does not "necessarily
prevent future criminality" because it does not address violent tendencies unrelated to sexual
drive. Id. at 132-33. This analysis is incomplete because it does not incorporate the
"medically appropriate" requirement, which will presumably ensure that MPA sentenced
defendants are likely to experience a decreased likelihood of re-offense when treated. See
discussion infra Parts III.B, IV.B.
11. Mandatory MPA treatments implicate the issue of whether an individual's First
Amendment right to mental autonomy is violated because MPA decreases sexual fantasies in
its recipients. Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 26-31 (discussing the right to mental autonomy and
its relation to statutes that proscribe administration of a drug that decreases sexual thoughts).
Whether a statute interferes with the mental autonomy guaranteed by the First Amendment
depends on the degree of the intrusion. Id. Administration of MPA is not so intrusive so as to
violate the First Amendment. Id. at 28 (detailing an analysis of MPA treatment and the test
for determining whether an intrusion violates the First Amendment right to mental autonomy).
See also Berlin, supra note 8, at 186-88, 210-12 (concluding that First Amendment rights are
not violated); G.L. Stelzer, Note, Chemical Castration and the Right to Generate Ideas: Does
the First Amendment Protect the Fantasies of Convicted Pedophiles?, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1675,
1704-09 (1997) (proposing that a new test is needed to determine whether MPA statutes
violate the First Amendment).
12. Spalding, supra note 8, at 128-30 (arguing that the statute violates the federal
right to privacy); Keene, supra, note 5, at 813-17 (arguing that the statute violates the right to
privacy in the Florida Constitution).
13. Ch. 97-184, § 2, 1997 Fla. Laws 3455, 3457 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 794.0235
(1997)). Section two of Chapter 97-184 of the Laws of Florida reads as follows:
If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or
applications of the act which can be given effect without the invalid provision
or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared
severable.
1998]
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The department of corrections anticipates that no more than three
persons will be eligible for the MPA treatment within the next year.14 This
is probably because not all defendants are medically appropriate for the
treatment.15  Additionally, prison officials do not anticipate the first
6treatments to begin for years. Defendants sentenced to MPA treatment are
not eligible to receive it until approximately one week before the expiration
of the their prison sentences. 17 It is possible that, by the time the Florida
Statute is challenged, there will be a United States Supreme Court opinion
addressing a similar statute on a federal right to privacy challenge.' 8 Florida
courts could then use such an opinion as a guide. In the meantime, however,
this is uncharted territory deserving of a constitutional debate.
This article analyzes the new hormonal control statute's validity under
Article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution, Florida's right to privacy,
and offers non-frivolous arguments for the application and extension of
existing law in advancing the proposition that the statute is constitutional.
Part II explains why the treatment should not be referred to as chemical
castration. Part Il provides an overview of the statute. Part IV describes the
MPA drug and explains how it decreases recidivism. Part V discusses the
federal right to privacy, and Part VI explains Florida's constitutional right to
privacy while proposing arguments for its constitutionality.
I1. "CONTROL" NOT "CASTRATION"
The administration of medroxyprogesterone acetate is properly phrased
"hormonal control" not "chemical castration." The word "castrate" suggests
removal of all sexual function. It is of paramount importance to understand
that MPA does not castrate, but rather controls and decreases the level of
testosterone in the brain, thereby causing the recipient to experience a
diminished sex drive. 19
Id.
14. Drug Castrations May be Years Away, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 2, 1997, at C6.
15. See discussion infra Parts III.B, IV.B.
16. Castration Legal, but Not Practiced-Yet, BRADENTON HERALD, June 2, 1997, at
L3.
17. FLA. STAT. § 794.0235(2)(b) (1997) (stating that MPA injections "shall
commence not later than one week prior to the defendant's release from prison or other
institution.").
18. See Wallace, supra note 3.
19. See discussion infra Part IV.
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A common myth of MPA treatment is that it causes impotence. 20
Although the frequency of spontaneous erections may decrease, MPA
recipients are still able to achieve an erection,22 have sex, and father
children. 24 The phrase "chemical castration" encourages the myth that MPA
prevents its recipients from committing a sexual offense by imposing
impotence.
The word "castration" conjures up images of medieval ceremonies
involving bloody torture tools.2 A medication that controls hormone levels
bears no relation to such torture. Yet, those torturous images cannot be
separated from the word "castration." Opponents of MPA, while cleverly
using it to create emotional dishevel, correctly define "castration" as "to
deprive of the testes," but fail to establish how decreasing sexual fantasy by
controlling levels of testosterone fits that definition.26 The statute does not
mention the phrase "chemical castration," and that phrase should not be used
in its description.27 The use of the phrase is prejudicial because it causes
emotional uncertainty, and is inaccurate because it does not properly
describe MPA treatment. Further, the use of the phrase is unnecessary
because the procedure can be called "hormonal control" in order to eliminate
this prejudice.
Conceivably, either "hormonal control therapy" or "hormonal control"
more accurately and less prejudicially describes the treatment. The role of
MPA in treating or "controlling" sexual offenders is to lower sexual libido
and the likelihood of a repeat offense by controlling the body's ability to
produce and process testosterone. 2S If physical sexual dysfunction, which
does not occur in all recipients, appears as a side effect, adjusting the
20. Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 7.
21. Id. at7.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Daniel L. Icenogle, Sentencing Male Sex Offenders to the Use of Biological
Treatments, 15 . LEGAL MED. 279, 285 (1994).
25. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 404 (1910) (explaining that the cruel
and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment was "intended to prohibit the
barbarities of... castration").
26. Keene, supra note 5, at 803 (quoting WEBsTmR's THIRD N w INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 349 (1993)).
27. See FLA. STAT. § 794.0235 (1997).
28. See discussion infra Part IV.
29. See discussion infra Part IV.
1998]
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dosage can reverse it.30 Clearly, "hormonal control" is the correct way to
describe MPA treatment.
III. THE HORMONAL CONTROL STATUTE
A. The MPA Sentence
Section 794.0235 of the Florida Statutes alters sentencing guidelines
for sexual battery defendants to include weekly injections of
medroxyprogesterone acetate. 31 The injections are in addition to, not instead
of, any prison sentence incurred by the same offense.32 Depending on the
particular defendant's past criminal history, the judge "may" or "shall"
33
sentence the defendant to undergo the treatment after release from prison.
For first-time sexual battery offenders, the judge has discretionary power to
impose the injections.34 If the offender, however, has a prior sexual battery
conviction, MPA treatment is mandatory. 35 In either case, when the judge is
determining the duration of the treatment, he or she can specify a specific
number of years or has discretion to order the treatment to continue for the
life of the defendant.
36
B. The Medical Expert and Medically Appropriate Requirement
Judges do not retain complete autonomy in sentencing offenders to
hormonal control. The requirement that a medical expert must determine the
defendant to be an appropriate candidate for the MPA treatment significantly
reduces the judge's power to impose the sentence.37  Any defendant
sentenced to MPA must be a medically appropriate candidate at the start of
the treatment and throughout the course of the injections. 38 In other words, a
defendant must be a medically appropriate candidate at all times to be
eligible for MPA.39 Unfortunately, the lawmakers did not define "medically
30. Berlin, supra note 8, at 181 (citing AMERICAN HOSPITAL FORMULARY SERVICE, 96
DRUG INFORMATION 2333, 2333 (Gerald K. McEvoy ed., 1996)).
31. FLA. STAT. § 794.0235 (1997).
32. Id. § 794.0235(1)0,).
33. Id. § 794.0235(1)(a)(b).
34. Id. § 794.0235(1)(a).
35. Id. § 794.0235(1)(b).
36. FLA. STAT. § 794.0235(2)(a) (1997).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 794.0235(2)(a), (3).
39. Id. § 794.0235(3).
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appropriate."''4 The logical interpretation is that a defendant is a medically
appropriate candidate if the medical expert determines that MPA will
produce the desired effect if administered. The desired effect is a decrease
in the recipient's sexual libido.41 This interpretation would exclude women
completely because MPA is a widely used female contraceptive and does not
significantly affect a woman's libido.42
C. The Alternatives
The statute permits defendants to refuse the treatment by allowing two
alternatives.43 First, a defendant may submit a motion to the court for
physical castration instead of hormonal control. 44 This motion gives the
judge the power to levy a physical castration sentence in lieu of the MPA.45
46The second option is to simply refuse hormonal control and stay in jail.
Refusal by a sentenced offender to undergo treatment is a second-degree
felony.47 This option to refuse treatment remains available throughout the
course of treatment, and the defendant may at any time choose to discontinue
the hormone control therapy and return to prison.
The Department of Corrections provides the services needed to49
administer the treatment to the defendant. The weekly injections begin one
week prior to the defendant's release from prison, and continue through the
duration of the term specified by the sentencing judge.:° It is estimated that
the treatments will cost the Department of Corrections $2000 per year for
each defendant, plus any incidental costs of staffing and additional
facilities.
5 1
40. Id.
41. See discussion infra Part IV.
42. Recent Legislation, supra note 7, at 800.
43. FLA. STAT. § 794.0235(2)(a), (5) (1997).
44. Id. § 794.0235(1)(b).
45. Id.
46. Id. § 794.0235(5).
47. Id.
48. See FLA. STAT. § 794.0235 (1997).
49. Id. § 794.0235(3).
50. Id. § 794.0235(2)(a).
51. Drug Castrations May Be Years Away, supra note 14.
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IV. MEDROXYPROGESTERONE ACETATE
A. MPA Therapy Generally
Proper analysis of the hormonal control statute requires an
understanding of what MPA is, on whom it will work, how it works, and
how it affects its recipient. When analyzing a statute calling for mandatory
medical treatment, issues such as effectiveness and adverse side effects are
important to determine whether the treatment is the least intrusive means of
accomplishing the statute's goal.52  For example, if the drug does not
accomplish the desired effects, it fails the least intrusive method requirement
because the least intrusive means of achieving nothing is nothing.
Accordingly, if a drug capable of achieving the desired results on certain
individuals is mandated for individuals not within that class, the drug, in
effect, does nothing, and is not the least intrusive means of producing that
result. In essence, if the drug does not accomplish the purported goal of the
law, it is not necessarily related to the state interest involved. Understanding
possible and probable side effects is required to fully anticipate the degree to
which administration of a drug will infringe on a person's private life and
make a decision as to whether other methods are less invasive in
accomplishing the government's goal.
MPA, more commonly known as Depo-Provera, a non experimental53
synthetic hormone, is the most commonly used hormonal control drug.
54
When administered to males intravenously on a weekly basis, it decreases
uncontrollable sexual libidos by controlling testosterone levels. 55  MPA
alleviates the amount of testosterone in the body by increasing testosterone
metabolism in the liver and reducing the amount of testosterone produced by
56the testes . This induces a tranquilizing effect on the brain, relieving the
recipient of his unmanageable sexual impulses by decreasing the frequency
of sexual fantasies.57
52. See discussion infra Parts VI.C.4, IV.D.4.
53. Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 6.
54. Icenogle, supra note 24, at 284.
55. Id. at 284.
56. Stelzer, supra note 11, at 1683-84. See generally Icenogle, supra note 24, at
283-84 (explaining the "physiology of male sex hormones").
57. Stelzer, supra note 11, at 1684.
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B. The Paraphiliac
Research shows that MPA reduces recidivism for sexual offenders
suffering from a paraphiliac disorder.5 8 Paraphiliacs exhibit "a pattern of
sexual arousal, erection and ejaculation," commonly formalized by a
"specific fantasy or its actualization." 59  This means that the individual
achieves sexual excitement from a particular fantasy or by acting out that
fantasy in real life. 60 For example, a pedophile with a paraphiliac disorder
would become sexually aroused by a fantasy involving sexual relations with
a child or by actually having sexual relations with a child.61
When attempting to diagnose a paraphiliac disorder, a doctor typically
relies on whether "persistent fantasies about some type of deviant sex" are
present.62 If these fantasies are not satisfied, the individual experiences
"intense cravings" which, if left unfulfilled, will cause the individual to
suffer "negative feelings."'63 In other words, paraphiliacs have a fantasy
about some type of non conventional, possibly illegal, sexual act.' The
fantasy is beyond the individual's control, in so far as he cannot change it or
prevent himself from having it.65 If the individual fails to act out the fantasy
in real life, he suffers some degree of mental anguish.66 If the pedophile
from the earlier example resisted the urge to have sexual relations with a
child, as dictated by his fantasy, he would suffer "intense cravings" to fulfill
the fantasy, which would ultimately cause him mental suffering.
67
The paraphiliac's past probably includes "manifested stereotyped
sexual activity because satisfaction of these cravings requires precise
recreation of the fantasy."68 This means that, at some point, the individual
has probably acted out his exact fantasy in real life because the cravings
suffered as a result of the fantasies can only be satisfied if the fantasy is
58. Icenogle, supra note 24, at 285 (discussing research conducted by the Johns
Hopkins Sexual Disorders Clinic).
59. Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 4.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. Icenogle, supra note 24, at 281 (citing Berlin & Meincke, Treatment of Sex
Offenders with Antiandrogenic Medication: Conceptualization, Review of Treatment
Modalities and Preliminary Findings, 138 AM. J. PsYcHIATRY 601, 601 (1981)).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See Icenogle, supra note 24, at 281.
68. Id.
1998]
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69precisely recreated. In terms of the pedophile example, only a child partner
can fulfill the urges imposed by the fantasy of having sexual relations with a
child.70 An adult partner would prevent precise recreation of the fantasy and
would not temper the unmanageable "intense cravings." 71 The fantasies and
the corresponding behavior remain for an indefinite period and tend to stay
72the same over time. In terms of paraphiliacs experiencing an illegal
fantasy, this is bad news because it makes them extremely likely to commit
the crime in the same manner yet again.
73
In the case of a paraphiliac, his fantasy is his enemy because his fantasy
is the catalyst that causes him to engage in the fantasized sexual activity,
which might be illegal.74 Denied of his fantasy, he would have "intense
cravings," requiring real life actualization of the sexual acts depicted in the
fantasy and his future would be less likely to include "manifested
stereotyped sexual activity. 75 MPA denies the fantasy.76 By decreasing the
amount of testosterone in the body, MPA sedates the brain and interrupts
sexual fantasies, including those perpetuating the cravings for illegal sex,
causing the sex drive and accompanying cravings to decrease.77  This
increases the offenders ability to control otherwise uncontrollable sexual
impulses.78
Because not all sexual offenders are paraphiliacs,79 the hormonal
control statute accounts for this discrepancy in effectiveness by allowing
administration of the drug to only those defendants deemed medically
appropriate for treatment by a medical expert. 8 The inclusion of such a
requirement ensures that defendants are not indiscriminately sentenced to
MPA treatment.8'
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. Icenogle, supra note 24, at 281.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.; see also Stelzer, supra note 11, at 1684.
77. Stelzer, supra note 11, at 1684.
78. Id.
79. Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 4-5 (discussing the types of sexual offenders).
80. FLA. STAT. § 794.0235(2)(a) (1997). See discussion supra Part III.B. (proposing
that "medically appropriate" requires that the defendant be the type of person that would be
less likely to committ the crime again if administered MPA).
81. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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C. Side Effects
Some recipients report side effects including "weight gain, mild
lethargy, cold sweats, hot flashes, nightmares, hypertension, elevated blood
sugar, shortness of breath, and lessened testis size. 82 Recipients rarely
suffer anything but minimal side effects. 83 The list of side effects may seem
extensive, but it is important to note that whenever a drug is used for a new
or different objective, all of its potential side effects, no matter how remote,
must be documented and registered. 4
MPA does not cause an inability to achieve erection or ejaculation. 5
Although the body's ability to experience spontaneous erections and
ejaculations does decrease, recipients of the treatment do retain the physical
and mental ability necessary to engage in sexual activity when stimulated by
a partner.86 In fact, MPA recipients concede that the treatment minimally
affects consensual sexual activity. Furthermore, men have fathered
88
children while undergoing MPA treatment. Hypothetically, adverse effects
on one's sex drive can be adjusted by changing the MPA dosage.8 9 In any
case, effects of the drug cease upon discontinuation of treatment. 90
V. FEDERAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. The Implied Right to Privacy
Although the "Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of
privacy,"91 the right to privacy implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution has been interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court to protect areas such as contraception 92 and abortion.93 The
82. Icenogle, supra note 24, at 285. See generally Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 7
(discussing additional "possible" side effects).
83. Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 7.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Icenogle, supra note 24, at 285.
89. Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 7.
90. Icenogle, supra note 24, at 285.
91. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (discussing the history of the implied
right to privacy).
92. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (invalidating a statute that
forbade contraceptive use because it infringed upon the right of marital privacy).
1998]
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Supreme Court has never held that hormonal control of sexual offenders is
unconstitutional. 94 However, the right to privacy granted by the United
States Constitution is not at issue here. The right to privacy contained in
Florida's Constitution is broader and provides more comprehensive
protection against governmental intrusion than its federal counterpart.
95
B Supreme Court Treatment of Biological Alteration
It is important to examine how the United States Supreme Court has
treated biological alteration in the past, so that a foundation can be laid for
litigation in the future. 96 In Jacobson v. Massachusetts,97 the Court upheld a
criminal sentence imposed for refusing to submit to a smallpox
vaccination. 98 The Court, in Buck v. Bell,99 upheld a law as constitutional
which called for involuntary sterilization of mental defectives for the welfare
of society.1°  In Skinner v. Oklahoma,'01 the Court invalidated a law
mandating sterilization of defendants convicted of two felonies without
addressing the biological alteration issue on the grounds that the law violated
102the Equal Protection Clause by not including white collar crimes. The
Washington v. Harper103 decision upheld forcible administration of
antipsychotic drugs that alter the chemistry of the brain' °4
It is clear that, under certain circumstances, what might be
unconstitutional if applied to the general public may be constitutional with
respect to certain groups of individuals when their special circumstances call
for special treatment. The Court in Buck articulated this thought by
providing that its ruling was "confined to the small number who are in the
93. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (invalidating a state law permitting abortion only to save
a mother's life).
94. Recent Legislation, supra note 7, at 799.
95. See, e.g., Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Dep't of Bus.
Regulation, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985).
96. See generally Sheldon Gelman, The Biological Alteration Cases, 36 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1203, 1204-15 (1995) (analyzing Supreme Court decisions regarding
biological alteration).
97. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
98. Id. at 31.
99. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
100. Id. at 207.
101. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
102. Id. at 538.
103. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
104. Id. at 227.
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institutions named" and did not apply "to the multitudes outside."'10 5 The
Supreme Court's treatment of cases involving the invasion of bodily
autonomy reveal that a state's compelling interest in mandating a particular
procedure can override an individual's right to maintain complete control
over his or her body.
VI. FLORIDA'S RIGHT OF PRIVACY
A. Article I, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution
In 1980, Florida amended its constitution to include a statute providing
an explicit right to privacy ensuring that "[e]very natural person has the right
to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life."'1 6
Section 23 of the Florida Constitution is broader and encompasses
protection of a greater number of privacy interests than the implied right to
privacy in the United States Constitution.
0 7
B. Statutory Construction of the Right to Privacy
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Traylor v. State,'°s held that Florida
courts should look first to the text of the Florida Constitution to determine
the nature and scope of personal rights of Florida residents.' 9  The
lawmakers struck the words "unwarranted" and "unreasonable" from the
preceding phrase "governmental intrusion" in order to make the Florida
Constitution sweep more broadly." 0 The "phrase 'right to be let alone' from
government intrusion" was intentionally chosen to distinguish "Florida's
broad privacy right from the limited federal right.""' This is clear evidence
that the lawmakers and the citizens who voted for the statute intended it to
105. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
106. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
107. See, e.g., Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Dep't of Bus.
Regulation, 477 So. 2d 544,548 (Fla. 1985).
108. 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992).
109. Id. at 962.
110. See, e.g., Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 548.
111. Mozo v. State, 632 So. 2d 623, 632 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). The federal
right to privacy was significantly narrowed by the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967), when the Court announced that "protection of a person's general right
to privacy.., is... left largely to the law of the individual States." Id. at 350-51. (refusing to
allow federal right to privacy protection for government's listing and recording an individual's
telephone conversation at a public pay phone).
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provide more comprehensive protection from government interference than
that which the national constitution provides.!
2
C. The Right to Privacy Test
Florida's privacy amendment does not explicitly provide a standard for
reviewing a governmental intrusion into an individual's private life.' 3 In
Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Department of Business
Regulation, 14 the Supreme Court of Florida articulated the accepted test for
Florida's right to privacy challenges." 5 The test can be broken down into
four simple parts. 1 6  First, the challenger must have had a legitimate
expectation of privacy. 117 Second, if a legitimate expectation of privacy
exists, the individual is found to have a fundamental right." 8 Third, since a
fundamental right is at issue, the state must show that it has a compelling
interest to warrant the abridgement of the individual's privacy. 19 Last, the
state must prove that it is utilizing the least intrusive method available to
accomplish its goal.' 2° Florida's right to privacy provides comprehensive
protection from governmental intrusion, but it does not act as an unwavering
warrantee against all intrusion into an individual's private life.121
Defendants may claim protection under Article I, section 23 of the
Florida Constitution because, although some constitutional rights of
prisoners are abridged or alienated completely during incarceration, the right
to privacy guaranteed by the Florida Constitution remains intact.12  Since
the right to privacy protects those to whom the hormonal control statute
applies, the statute must pass muster under the Florida Constitution.
112. See e.g., Mozo, 632 So. 2d at 633.
113. Id.
114. 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985).
115. Id. at 547. See also, Jon Mills, Sex, Lies, and Genetic Testing: What Are Your
Rights to Privacy in Florida? 48 FLA. L. REv. 813, 823-24 (1996) (discussing the "legal test"
for Florida's right to privacy).
116. Mills, supra note 115, at 823-24.
117. Id. at 823.
118. Id. at 824.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1027 (Fla. 1995).
122. Singletary v. Costello, 665 So. 2d. 1099, 1105 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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1. Legitimate Expectation of Privacy
Florida courts use a "legitimate" expectation of privacy test to
determine the interests protected by Florida's constitutional right to
privacy. 23  The courts have held that the words "unreasonable" and
"unwarranted" are reminiscent of the narrower federal expectation of
privacy test. 124 The federal test provides protection of an individual's
expectation of privacy only if society recognizes it as reasonable to do so.
25
Florida's right to privacy deliberately omitted the words "unreasonable" and
"unwarranted."' 26 This omission "makes it clear that the Florida right of
privacy was intended to protect an individual's expectation of privacy
regardless of whether society recognizes that expectation as reasonable."'127
This is consistent with the fact that the lawmakers intended Florida's right to
privacy to provide broader protection against governmental intrusion than its
federal counterpart. 2
The test for determining whether an individual has an expectation of
privacy is easily broken down into three parts: 1)the individual must have a
subjective expectation of privacy;129 2) the expectation must not be spurious
or false; 30 and 3) the expectation must not conflict with society's values.13 1
First, the existence and scope of an individual's subjective expectation of
privacy as determined by consideration of all of the circumstances must be
established by placing emphasis on the "objective manifestations of that
123. Mozo v. State, 632 So. 2d 623, 633 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (providing an
excellent description and explanation for the legitimate expectation of privacy test).
124. Id. The federal expectation of privacy test was articulated by the Supreme Court in
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) to determine whether an individual qualified for
Fourth Amendment protection against having his telephone conversations at a public phone
booth listened to and recorded. Id. at 361. That case developed a two-prong test for
determining an individual's expectation of privacy. Id. at 361. The person must have an
"actual (subjective) expectation of privacy," and the expectation must be such that society is
willing to accept it as being reasonable. Id. (internal quotations omitted). The test turns on
"whether the defendant was reasonable in his belief of privacy," while the legitimate
expectation of privacy test recognizes an individual's expectation of privacy even if it is not
reasonable. Mozo, 632 So. 2d at 633-34.
125. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361; see also Mozo, 632 So. 2d at 633-34 (distinguishing the
federal and Florida expectation of privacy tests).
126. See, e.g., Mozo, 632 So. 2d at 634.
127. Id. at 633-34.
128. See, e.g., In reT.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989).
129. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
130. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
131. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
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expectation."'132  Defendants do not manifest an expectation that future
sexual fantasies will be within the protected zone of privacy because they
implicitly invited the state to intrude into such activity by committing sexual
battery. Knowledge that the commission of a crime gives rise to a
governmental -duty to punish and prevent the crime involved should be
imputed. The state needs to intrude into a defendant's sex life to prevent an
offense from occurring again, because sex is the offender's weapon of
choice. Defendants constructively forfeit an expectation of privacy with
respect to sexual activity when they commit a sexual battery, knowing that
criminal activity mandates governmental intrusion to the extent that it is
necessary to punish and prevent future offenses.
Next, the expectation of privacy must not be "spurious" or "false."' 33 A
sexual battery offender's claim of an expectation of privacy for sexual
fantasies is "spurious" and "false" because, while perpetrating a sexual
offense, sexual offenders are aware of the government's duty to prevent him
from doing it again. 134 In addition, he is cognizant of the fact that this duty
necessitates an intrusion by the government into an offender's sexual
fantasy, a component of an individual's private life, when that component is
prompting the illegal activity.135 The government is seeking to intrude upon
the sexual fantasies of offenders whose fantasies cause them to commit
sexual offenses. The offenders' awareness that the government's duty
reasonably warrants such an intrusion negates the truth of subsequent claims
of privacy over the sexual fantasies that prompted him to perpetrate the
sexual battery, making any such claims "spurious" and "false." 3
Finally, these expectations must then be placed "in the context of a
society and the values that the society seeks to foster" because each person is
not an "island of self-determination."'' 37 Society seeks to discourage sexual
offenders from committing sexual batteries. Society does not support
132. North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1995) (citing Stall v. State,
570 So. 2d 257, 260 (Fla. 1990) (holding that a legitimate expectation of privacy does not
exist for visiting retail establishments selling obscene materials)) (finding that job applicant
did not have legitimate expectation of privacy against the City's requiring her to reveal
whether or not she smoked, because smokers disclose whether they smoke on a regular basis).
133. Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 153 (Fla. 1989) (Ehrlich, J., concurring
specially).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. State v. Conforti, 688 So. 2d 350, 359 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that
erotic dancers did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy while performing lewd acts in
front of a paying customer at a publicly patronized location).
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releasing a paraphilic sexual offender from prison without additional
safeguards because it is probable that he will commit another sexual battery
upon an innocent person. A sexual offender's expectation of privacy for
sexual activity and fantasies after incarceration is not legitimate with respect
to the values that society seeks to support. If the court finds that a legitimate
expectation does exist, that interest is presumptively protected from
governmental intrusion, 38 and the right to privacy is invoked. 39
The privacy issue is best stated as whether an offender retains a
legitimate expectation of privacy for sexual fantasies after being released
from prison, not whether the defendant enjoys an expectation of privacy for
future sexual batteries. The latter is not at issue because it has been held that
there is no legitimate expectation of privacy while committing a sex crime.14°
A sexual battery defendant's subjective expectation of privacy towards his
future sexual activity is limited. Whenever the state attempts to punish or
rehabilitate, a defendant impliedly loses some of the privacy he or she
enjoys.
In Fosman v. State,'4' the Fourth District Court of Appeal limited a
defendant's expectation of privacy by allowing the state's invasion into a
situation derived from his alleged sexual battery.' 42 The court held that a
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy interest in
refusing to take a blood test in order to inform the victim of the defendant's
mHV status. 143 This case demonstrated that a criminal act might forfeit the
legitimacy of the expectation of privacy not only during the criminal act but
also in subsequent circumstances stemming from the criminal act. 44 The
defendant's HIV status had no relevance to his guilt or innocence. 45 His act
138. Mozo v. State, 632 So. 2d 623, 634 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
private conversations over a cordless telephone are "presumptively protected" from
government intrusion because it is not "spurious or false" for a person to expect that the
government will not, "without cause or suspicion," listen and record telephone conversations).
139. See, e.g., Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Dep't of Bus.
Regulation, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).
140. Shapiro v. State, 696 So. 2d 1321, 1326 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (finding no
legitimate expectation of privacy for a therapist's unlawful sexual activity with a patient).
141. 664 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App 1995).
142. Id. at 1166.
143. Id. (reasoning that "where there is probable cause to believe that a person has
committed sexual battery and transmitted bodily fluids to the victim" the defendant does not
have a privacy interest in refusing a HIV test when the results of the test will be "disclosed
only to the victim and to public health authorities" because he does not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy).
144. See id.
145. See id.
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of sexual battery warranted special circumstances rendering him incapable of
maintaining the required expectation of privacy.
46
Thus, by committing a sexual battery, a defendant implicitly extends an
invitation to the state to prevent future sexual batteries by intruding on his
sexual fantasies when those fantasies prompt the illegal sexual activity. That
invitation precludes defendants from having a legitimate expectation of
privacy with respect to sexual fantasies. If the defendant does not have a
legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to his sexual fantasies, then
the right to privacy does not apply to the hormonal control statute.
2. Fundamental Right
If a court finds that an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy
exists, a fundamental right to protect that privacy interest also exists." A
fundamental right qualifies for strict scrutiny, requiring the state to prove
that the law is necessarily related to a compelling state interest. 48 Assuming
that the defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in sexual fantasies,
a fundamental right to protect that interest exists. This right can only be
infringed upon by the least intrusive method to achieve a compelling state
interest. 149
3. Compelling Interest
Florida courts have approached the compelling interest issue differently
depending on whether the government was intruding on private information
or private decisions. 5 When the state seeks to discover private information,
the courts have balanced the individual's right to privacy against the state's
compelling interest. 51 However, when a private decision is being infringed
146. See Fosman, 664 So. 2d at 1166.
147. Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Dep't of Bus. Regulation, 477 So.
2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).
148. Id. at 547.
149. Id. The test employed "shifts the burden of proof to the state to justify an intrusion
on privacy." Id. The burden is met when the state establishes that "the challenged regulation
serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes its goal through the use of the least
intrusive means." Id.
150. Mills, supra note 115, at 825.
151. Id. (citing Florida v. Rolling, 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2264, 5 (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct.,
July 27, 1994) (holding the public's "right to information" is paramount to an individuals
interest in preventing the release of crime scene photos after balancing the public's right
against the victim's families right to privacy)).
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upon, the court applies the traditional strict scrutiny test, which requires the
state to demonstrate that the law is necessarily related to a compelling state
interest.152 Administration of MPA deals with a private decision, not private
information, because the state is not seeking to compel disclosure of
anything from the defendant. 53  Since the statute infringes on a private
decision, the traditional strict scrutiny analysis, as opposed to the balancing
test, is appropriate. Although Florida courts have developed a different way
of articulating this test by stating that the state must demonstrate that the law
"serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes its goal through the use
of the least intrusive means,"'1-4 this test is the same as traditional strict
scrutiny, requiring that the law be necessarily related to a compelling
government interest. 55
The state has a compelling interest in protecting its citizens. 56 The
legislators who wrote and passed the law intended it to be both a deterrent
and a rehabilitative tool. 57  Thus, the purpose of the law is to protect
innocent third parties from being the victims of sexual batteries.
4. Least Intrusive Method
After the state establishes that the statute serves a compelling interest in
protecting innocent third parties, it must establish that chemical castration is
the least intrusive method for accomplishing that goal. 58 The hormonal
control statute seeks to prevent sexual crimes against its citizens. It purports
to accomplish this through hormonal control. Although hormonal control
may not be an effective treatment for all defendants because the law does not
152. Id. (citing Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1273 (Fla. 1996) (deciding whether
grandparent visitation could be granted over a parent's objections)).
153. Id.
154. Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Dep't of Bus. Regulation, 477 So.
2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).
155. See id. at 547 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (fundamental rights
may only be limited by a regulation that is narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling state
interest)).
156. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 14 (Fla. 1990).
157. Mark Silva, Chemical Castration Approved, MIAMI HERALD, May 3, 1997, at 6B
(quoting Senator Al Gutman, Senate Criminal Justice Committee Chairman, as saying that
MPA treatment "will assist those who can not assist themselves because of high
testosterone"); Jeremy Wallace, Chemical Castration Bill Becomes Law on Oct. 1,
BRADENTON HERALD, May 31, 1997, at L1 (stating that Representative Mark Ogles, co-author
of the law, said "the new law will be a deterrent for many would-be sex offenders").
158. Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Dep't of Bus. Regulation, 477 So.
2d 544,547 (Fla. 1985).
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apply to all defendants. 159  The law only applies to defendants when a
medical expert determines them to be medically appropriate for MPA
treatment. 160 Medically appropriate is taken to mean that MPA treatment
will produce the desired effect of decrease in sexual libido, 161 which will by
implication lower the probability that the defendant will commit another
sexual battery.
Hormonal control is the least intrusive method of preventing medically
appropriate defendants from committing future sexual batteries against
innocent third parties. Those deemed medically appropriate will experience
a decrease in libido resulting in a decreased chance of recidivism by the
defendant, which will ultimately cause a decrease in sexual crime against
citizens of the state. No other treatment prevents future sexual batteries and
allows the defendant all the other liberties of living a free life. The only
other alternative is incarceration, which is more intrusive than MPA because
it involves a forfeiture of physical liberty.
D. Florida's Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
Unlike the federal constitutional right to refuse medical treatment,
which is in the Due Process Clause, 162 the Supreme Court of Florida found
the right to refuse medical treatment guaranteed by Florida's Constitution.1
63
A defendant retains this right during and after incarceration.164 The right to
refuse medical treatment is not dependent on a determination of a "medical
procedure as major or minor, ordinary or extraordinary, life-prolonging, life-
maintaining, life-sustaining, or otherwise."'' 65 Thus, under this definition,
the administration of MPA falls within this right regardless of the fact that it
is a minor and safe therapy.
159. See supra Part III.B.
160. FLA. STAT. § 794.0235(2)(a) (1997). The hormonal control statute only applies to
those defendants that are "appropriate candidate[s] for treatment." Id.
161. See supra Part III.B.
162. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 262 (1990).
163. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1990).
164. Singletary v. Costello, 665 So. 2d 1099, 1105 (Fla. 1996) (finding that a prisoner
had the right to refuse food and water while incarcerated).
165. Id. at 1104 (quoting In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 12 (Fla.
1990)).
520 [Vol. 23:499
20
Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 11
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss1/11
Clarke
1. Consent
A defendant "may not forcibly [be] given medical treatment without
express or implied consent." 166  Under the hormonal control statute, a
defendant is never forcibly injected with MPA without consent. 167  The
defendant may expressly consent to the treatment, but it is more probable
that the defendant will protest its administration. However, by accepting
probation, when hormonal control is a condition of probation, he will
168impliedly consent to the treatment. Consent is also implied when
defendants appear for and submit to weekly MPA injections. Any protest to
administration should be irrelevant so long as the defendant's outward
manifestations of agreeing to the probation and appearing for the injections
are present. All defendants retain the right, at all times, to refuse this
medical treatment and opt for incarceration or physical castration. 169 Anydefendant may refuse MPA treatment, at any time.
2. "Voluntary" Consent
Opponents of the statute argue that consent can not be voluntary
because refusal to consent results in a second-degree felony.17  There is no
reason to think that any defendant will be forced or coerced to accept
probation. Moreover, it is unlikely that the department of corrections is
going to hold defendants down and forcibly administer the weekly
injections. The defendant will voluntarily accept probation and the
conditions of probation and voluntarily submit to weekly injections. Again,
a defendant at all times reserves the right to refuse treatments and return to
jail or be physically castrated.17 1
166. Id. (quoting Metropolitan Dade County v. P.L. Dodge Foundations, Inc., 509
So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (stating prisoner's rights in dicta)).
167. FLA. STAT. § 794.0235(2)(a), (5) (1997); see supra Part III.C.
168. FLA. STAT. § 794.0235(2)(a), (5) (1997).
169. I. § 794.0235(1)(b), (5). See discussion infra Part III.C.
170. Spalding, supra note 8, at 128 (arguing that refusing treatment "is no option at
all" because the "choice cannot be held to be made freely, knowingly, or voluntarily" due to
the fact that refusal results in incarceration).
171. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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3. Compelling Interest
Even if a court finds voluntary and informed consent is lacking, the
statute does not violate a defendant's right to refuse medical treatment
because the state is utilizing the least intrusive method available to
accomplish a compelling state interest. The Supreme Court of Florida has
articulated four compelling state interests that should be weighed against an
individuals right to refuse medical treatment. 172 They are the preservation of
life, the protection of innocent third parties, the prevention of suicide, and
the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession.'7 The
court in Singletary v. Costello174 added that where the individual happens to
be a prisoner, the "state interest in . . . the rehabilitation of prisoners is
implicated."'
17
Of the interests identified, the protection of innocent parties and the
rehabilitation of defendants serve as compelling state interests for the
hormonal control statute. 17 6 The protection of innocent persons interest
"arises when the refusal of medical treatment endangers public health.' 77
MPA refusal endangers the public because it increases the chances that a
member of the public will be a victim of a sexual battery, an inherently
violent crime. Hormonal control decreases the chances that the defendant
will commit a sexual battery. 178 The statute protects the public by seeking to
rehabilitate defendants by providing them with the medication they need to
control their sexual impulses and resist the urge to commit sexual
batteries.
4. Least Intrusive Method
MPA treatment is the least intrusive method of protecting the public
against the sexual offenses perpetrated by paraphiliacs.18° The only other
172. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 14 (holding that the state interest should be
"balanced... against an individual's right to refuse medical treatment").
173. Id.
174. 665 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1996).
175. Id. at 1105 (quoting Commissioner of Corrections v. Myers, 399 N.E. 2d 452,457
(Mass. 1979)).
176. See supra note 157.
177. Singletary, 665 So. 2d at 1105.
178. See discussion supra Part IV.A-B.
179. See supra Part IV.A-B. and note 157.
180. See discussion supra Part VI.C.4.
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method, incarceration, is more intrusive into the private lives of offenders
because it calls for deprivation of the liberty of freedom.
18 1
VII. CONCLUSION
The lawmakers carefully drafted Florida's new hormonal control statute
to ensure constitutionality. The law's opponents challenge its
constitutionality with bald conclusions. Although medical technology
restricts the statutes' effectiveness by only allowing its success within
certain people, the lawmakers narrowly tailored the statute to apply to that
group, the paraphiliac. Upon careful analysis, however, it is clear that the
law does not violate Florida's Right to Privacy Amendment. The statute is
the first step towards a modem, more humane criminal justice system that
seeks public protection and actual rehabilitation rather than the illusory
rehabilitative benefits provided by the present prison system.
Mary E. Clarke
181. See discussion supra Part VI.C.4.
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